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Book Review  
In Search of a Materialist Ethics 
Review of Ted Stolze, Becoming Marxist. Studies in 
Philosophy, Struggle, and Endurance  
(Leinen: Brill/Historical Materialism Book Series) 
Review by Panagiotis Sotiris 
Ted Stolze’s Becoming Marxist is an impressive book and one of the most 
important recent contributions to the question of a materialist practice of philosophy. 
Although it is not a typical monograph, it is not simply a collection of texts. There is a 
common thread running through the different texts that gives the book the character of 
coherent research project into the possibility of a materialist intervention that could 
really support a politics of self-emancipation and the ethics and civility that go along with 
it. 
The first chapter of the book ‘What is a Philosophical Tendency’ begins with 
positing that materialism is not simply a philosophical position or system. Rather, within 
the terrain of philosophy we are dealing with ‘an interminable struggle between 
inextricably linked but evershifting materialist and idealist tendencies’ (p. 4). Stolze 
retraces this debate in the history of Marxism, stressing the importance of Louis 
Althusser’s conceptualisation of philosophy as kampfplatz between spontaneous 
materialist elements that emerge in the terrain of science and political practice and the 
idealism associated with ideological regression.1 He also refers to Althusser’s highly 
original conception of aleatory materialism and his rejection of any philosophical theory 
of Origin.2 Stolze then turns a very important text, namely Pierre Macherey’s text on the 
history of philosophy as a struggle of tendencies.3  
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Especially striking is Macherey’s argument that no philosophical category is ever 
fixed once and for all but is continually up for grabs, depending on the objective 
historical conditions and the outcome of the struggle between idealist and 
materialist tendencies. For example, Macherey insists that materialism is not 
realism but instead that realism is an ‘inconsequent materialism’. His point is that 
various forms of idealism have regularly exploited the category of the ‘real’ and 
substituted thought for objective material reality that in fact exists prior to and 
independent of thought. At the same time, he notes, idealism ‘dissimulates the true 
nature of philosophy as a struggle of tendencies’, claims to be ‘beyond’ such 
tendencies, and refuses to admit their existence. (p. 17) 
For Stolze, Macherey offers a more complex and nuanced image of the conflicting 
philosophical tendencies: ‘There exists a broad array of materialisms as well as 
idealisms; in the last instance, however, each distinctive variety of materialism or 
idealism belongs to just that philosophical kind and not the other’ (p. 19). It is exactly this 
that enables a ‘non-exploitative Marxist philosophical interventions must occur from 
within texts and traditions themselves, by identifying the concrete ways in which 
materialist and idealist tendencies arise, clash, and encroach upon one another’s 
conceptual space’ (p. 26). Stolze goes back to Althusser and his insistence that the 
emergence of philosophy requires the existence of social classes and the existence of 
science. He also stresses the importance of Lenin’s warning that intelligent idealism is 
preferable to vulgar materialism, and reminds of Michel Pêcheux’s insight that when we 
are discussing materialism and idealism we are not discussing symmetrical 
philosophical tendencies.4 Finally by means of a reference to André Tosel’s theory of a 
potential Marxist theory of action Stolze stresses in a certain way the practical and even 
normative aspects of such debates, at the same time suggesting that even a ‘communism 
of finitude’ (p. 34) will not spell the end of philosophy. 
The next chapter turns to a figure with whom Stolze is in constant dialogue: Paul 
of Tarsus, presented here as a thinker of the conjuncture, whose project was ‘the 
establishment of a vast network of inclusive and egalitarian urban assemblies in 
opposition to Roman imperial order’ (p. 37), by means of a ‘nonviolent resistance to 
Roman imperial domination’ (p. 49). Stolze is critical of Badiou’s approach to Paul5 since 
he thinks that ‘Badiou is more interested in Paul’s “doctrine” and so fails to grasp the 
importance of the apostle’s mission – his practice’ (p.51). Moreover, he stresses how Paul 
used as part of this mission also his practice as tentmaker, but also the fact that Paul 
was working within a broader movement.  
Stolze, who has an impressive knowledge of contemporary biblical literature deals 
with Paul also in chapter three which deals with Paul’s gift economy and a new system of 
value. 
Finally, though, the new system of value that Paul sketches, which reconfigures 
and exceeds the boundaries of the classical model of a household economy, 
recognises the hard work and suffering undergone by its members. It involves a 
commitment to sharing and hospitality with all, but with what could be called a 
preferential option for the poor. (p. 71). 
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That is why one can say that Paul not only calls for debt cancellation and economic 
redistribution, in this sense re-enacting the ancient Israelite ‘jubilee tradition,’ turning 
into the emancipatory imager of a ‘cosmic jubilee’ (p. 72). 
The next chapter picks up a question that Althusser had first posed, namely that of 
a theory of historical individuality. Stolze goes back to Lucien Sève and his theory of 
individuality.6 He reminds that for Sève theoretical anti-humanism can only be the critical 
starting point for a potential Marxist anthropology. Stolze suggests that Sève had a more 
dialectical approach than Althusser, since the latter mainly stressed the general figures 
of individuality but not the actual complexity and variety of actual concrete forms of 
historical individuality, ‘the fine-grained, concrete analysis that is required in order to 
show how a given mode of production appropriates human mental and physical 
capabilities, for instance, by constraining free time or stunting personal development’ (p. 
80). Moreover, Stolze suggests that in a similar manner to Althusser’s distinction 
between the real object and the object in thought a distinction can be made between 
‘between the concrete individual and the subjected individual’ (p. 82), and this distinction 
enables a thinking of the ways that individuals can trace emancipative paths beyond the 
constraints imposed by forms of ideological interpellation. 
As human beings in our individual composition, each of us strives to persist in our 
being and to increase our capacities to flourish. As a result, each of us in our own 
singularity always threatens to act as what could be called a ‘counter friction’ to 
disrupt the smooth operation of the interpellative machine. Again using Spinozist 
language, Sève envisions constructing a ‘science of the singular’ that would help 
one to identify and open up an emancipatory path along which all of humanity may 
journey together. (pp. 82-83) 
Returning to biblical examples, Stolze refers to Simon Peter. By a careful reading 
of the Biblical sources Stolze uses Simon Peter as a reference to suggest the complexity 
of the process by which concrete forms of individuality emerge, within specific 
conjunctures and specific forms of interpellation and counter-interpellation. Moreover, by 
stressing the discrepancy between the what we now about Simon Peter’s actual practice 
and a strong ethos of solidarity to all those marginalized by Roman Imperial Rule and the 
later canonisation of his trajectory as a call for conformity to dominant powers, Stolze 
offers an example of not only the complexity of the emergent of a concrete individual but 
also of the equal complex ways that within ideological formation particular individuals 
and their names are resignified. 
In the next chapter Stolze turns to the Hobbes and his conception of the multitude, 
and a potential theory of political passions and especially the ‘madness of the multitude’, 
stressing that instead of a pre-political madness Hobbes is actually referring to a revolt 
against a sovereign power. 
In Chapter Eight of Leviathan Hobbes is purportedly describing the vicissitudes of 
human beings in the state of nature prior to the emergence of the order and 
stability that is above all else the aim of a centralised sovereign power. Yet the 
scenario he actually depicts much more resembles one in which a previously law-
abiding people has degenerated into what in Chapter 22 he terms an unlawful 
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‘tumultuous assembly’ (L 22.33.33). As Hobbes explains in this later chapter, ‘it is 
not a set number that makes the assembly unlawful, but such a number as the 
present officers are not able to suppress and bring to justice’ (L 22.33). Although 
Hobbes does not explicitly characterize situations of ‘unlawful tumult’ (L 22.34) as 
manifestations of collective madness, the implication is there. The upshot of this 
theoretical ‘discrepancy’ is that in Chapter Eight Hobbes has already provided an 
example of prepolitical collective madness that would be much more appropriate 
for characterising the post-political multitude in revolt against an already-existing 
sovereign power. (p.104) 
For Stolze Hobbes’ conceptualization of the excessive passions and even 
‘madness’ of the Multitude expresses exactly a kind of ‘fear of the masses’ and the 
explanation that he offers is that ‘Hobbes’s individualism prevents him from fully 
grasping the mass political significance of the tumultuous events unfolding around him, 
their properly transindividual dynamic’ (p. 110). 
In the next chapter he turns to three affects in Spinoza that have not received 
proper attention, the affects of resistance: indignation, glory and serenity suggesting that 
each one corresponds to ‘a distinctive mode of political rebellion, namely, indignant 
rebellion, glorious rebellion, and serene rebellion’ (p. 113). Stolze stresses how Spinoza 
has a theory of indignation and how it has both a regulative and a constitutive aspect in 
regards to sovereign power and its constant re-articulation. However, for Spinoza 
indignation is a ‘bad passion’ as a destructive impulse and thus also has a theory of the 
‘transition from instrumentally bad to instrumentally good passions’ (p. 117). In contrast, 
Stolze thinks that it is glory as an affect that points towards an emancipatory historical 
agency.  
Stolze thinks that in ‘Part Five of the Ethics Spinoza famously proposes a kind of 
cognitive therapy by means of which human passional servitude can partially be 
overcome by the power of reason to redirect bad affects’ (p. 131). To that end in regards to 
indignation ‘it is necessary to counter its effect by strengthening the affect of generosity 
by reflecting on the usefulness of social solidarity’ (p. 133). This points to the importance 
of how ‘serenity is an essentially active joyous affect in contrast both to indignation, 
which is a passive sad affect, and to glory, which is a joyous affect but one that fluctuates 
between passive and active forms’ (p. 135). If we combine this with the Spinoza’s 
knowledge of the third kind. 
For Spinoza politics rooted in knowledge of the third kind would not be abstract 
and formal but would be qualitative, concrete, and would concern the order of 
everyday existence. As a result, persons who cultivated the affect of serenity 
would strive to extricate themselves from fear of failure and death and to 
understand that freedom is a constant struggle whose path is arduous: along the 
way victories are invariably mixed with defeats. A serene individual would not only 
persist in his or her desire for socio-political transformation over the long run, but 
in the very midst of social upheaval he or she would also seek to adopt, and 
sustain, what Spinoza memorably called the ‘perspective of eternity’ (species 
aeternitatis). (p. 137). 
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Stolze in many instances expresses his theoretical debt to Alexander Matheron 
and in particular his book Individu et communauté chez Spinoza [Individual and 
Community in Spinoza],7 so it seems rather natural to dedicate a chapter to Matheron’s 
reading of Spinoza. This how Stolze attempts to present the broader significance of this 
reading: 
Essentially, Spinoza is arguing for an indefinite enlargement of collective beatitude 
or what we could call a ‘politics of the third kind’. A wise person is able to form a 
‘community of minds’ not only with a small number of privileged individuals but 
potentially with all of humanity. Indeed, such a community of all minds has always 
already existed in itself ; this community-to-come only needs to be revealed to 
each of its members and thereby to be realised for itself. This requires the 
recomposition of finite modes and the establishment of enhanced communication 
among individuals. It is worth noting that for Spinoza a community of wise persons 
would not be ‘simpler’ than societies with imperia but would embody complex 
social-political institutions and would promote robust democratic debate. (pp. 147-
148). 
The next chapter, actually described by Stolze as an interlude, refers to the 
question of a potential ethics for Marxism. He turns to the Spinozist notion of fortitude. 
Indignation can be the first affective form of resistance, but is not enough. Consequently, 
what is needed is a ‘a second, more affirmative, moment of radicalisation: a ‘utopian’ – or 
perhaps ‘romantic’ – desire for a profoundly different world’ (p. 161). This is what he finds 
in fortitude as a combination of courage and generosity. 
What then is the relevance of Spinoza’s analysis of fortitude for radical political 
theory and practice? First of all, courage and generosity can emotionally bind 
persons together in pursuit of a collective project. As Macherey has argued, 
courage is a ‘force of character’ that is mutually reinforced and strengthened by 
generosity. Moreover, since fortitude, courage, and generosity are active and 
joyous affects, their cultivation and stabilisation can help groups avoid the pitfalls 
of passive and sad affects, namely, such passions as fear and hope. They can 
bolster what Hasana Sharp has termed Spinoza’s strategy of ‘anti-fear’. Finally, 
although Spinoza does not explicitly say as much, these affects can be, and are, 
imitated: those who find themselves in the company of courageous or generous 
persons are frequently led as well to take on these qualities. (p. 166) 
The next chapter deals with ‘a missed encounter between Karl Marx and his 
French contemporary, Claude Bernard, the leading physiologist of the nineteenth century 
and the discoverer of the key biological concept of what has come to be known as 
‘homeostasis’ (p. 177). Combining this return to conceptions of nature, life and labour in 
nineteenth century and contemporary debates on the metabolic rifts, Stolze proposes a 
conception of emancipation that also includes the ecological dimension. 
To reestablish the dignity of freely associated labour, then, would require not only 
healing the metabolic rift between humanity and nature and the social metabolic 
rift among persons but also restoring human homeostasis in order to insure fair 
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opportunity for the fulfilment of human ‘purpose and desire’ in the workplace and 
throughout the larger society. (p. 184) 
In the next chapter, entitled ‘Hegel or Spinoza:  Substance, Subject and Critical 
Marxism,’ Stolze attempts to answer recent criticisms of the ‘Spinozist turn’ of radical 
thinkers, criticisms that have been made by thinkers such Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou. 
Stolze is critical of both claims that somehow the return Spinoza represents the ideology 
of late capitalism but also the idea the only possible conception of the Whole would be a 
Hegelian one. Moreover, he insists that it is unfair to treat Spinoza’s work as lacking a 
reference to subjectivity, if we look at Spinoza Ethics. At the same time, following 
Macherey8 Stolze insists that ‘[b]y making thought an attribute of substance, Spinoza 
construed knowledge as an absolutely objective process without a subject and freed its 
internal causal movement from any teleological presupposition’ (p. 195). Moreover, for 
Stolze ‘Spinoza’s conception of selfhood as inextricably caught up in causal relations, by 
contrast, provides the basis for an ecologically embedded perspective that continues to 
be both more plausible and useful for political theory and practice (p.196). 
The next chapter, entitled ‘Contradictions of Hyperreality: Baudrillard, Žižek, and 
Virtual Dialectics’, begins with a very interesting comparison between Leibniz and Ernst 
Bloch. For Stolze, ‘Leibniz held a position that the actual arises from, and is dependent 
on, the virtual’ (p. 200), whereas for Bloch ‘the virtual arises from, and is dependent on, 
the actual’ (p. 201). Stolze uses Bloch’s critique of Leibniz as a way to discuss 
Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality and the ‘inverted Leibnizianism’ that can be found in 
this perspective. 
It would be difficult to find a more revealing account of Baudrillard’s inverted 
Leibnizianism: the reassertion of windowless monads, the invocation of a 
holographic universe in which each individual expresses the totality of all 
individuals but only from within – the outside has effectively dissolved. External 
relations between and among individuals have folded into, been exhausted by, 
internal relations alone. (p. 205) 
Stolze suggests that Spinoza already offered in his time an answer to Leibniz that 
in a certain way also points towards the limits of Baudrilliard’s position. Instead of a 
virtual possibility which is already there at the beginning, Spinoza points towards the 
constant reopening of historical possibility within the singularity of bodies and 
conjunctures, something that can help us go beyond Baudrilliard’s pessimism.  
In Leibniz’s metaphysics virtual possibilities simply await their actualisation; in 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, though, we discover something ‘less than substance’ that 
drives and incessantly reopens the ontological process by which both singular 
things (actualities) and accompanying new real-possibilities (virtualities) arise. (p. 
207) 
The next chapter, entitled ‘A Marxist Encounter with the Philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze,’ attempts a reading of the encounter and dialogue of Deleuze (and Guattari) with 
Marxism, including a defence of the notion of micropolitics.  
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Micropolitics isn’t intended to replace class struggle but to operate as a militant 
analysis (or an analysis for militants) that might help to prevent left organisations 
and mass movements from reproducing within their ranks precisely the same 
hierarchies, the same certitudes, the same oppressions that already exist in class 
society. (p. 216) 
Chapter 12, ‘Deleuze and Althusser: Flirting with Structuralism’ discusses a 
dialogue between Deleuze and Althusser on structuralism and in particular their 
exchange in regards to Deleuze’s text on structuralism.9 In that text Deleuze, attempted 
to offer some criteria that could facilitate the recognition of ‘structuralism’ in order to 
avoid elusive generalizations: ‘a symbolic criterion, a topological criterion, a differential 
and singular criterion, a serial criterion, and a criterion involving the “empty case”’ (p. 
222). These criteria indeed offer a way to recognize the broad movement usually labelled 
‘structuralism’, stressing the particular theoretical modalities that can be found in such 
texts, beyond the simple reference to the ‘structure’, and also including in the last 
criterion the question of displacement between series that in the eyes of Deleuze makes 
possible a structural mutation or a revolutionary practice.  
According to Stolze, Althusser’s response to Deleuze offered two main points of 
criticism. One was that usually when referring to structuralism different writers and 
currents are put together despite their many differences. The other had to do with the 
emphasis on the symbolic which may be appropriate in domains such as psychoanalysis 
but not in other. Consequently, 
What Althusser (by way of Macherey) seems to be most concerned about in his 
letter to Deleuze, then, is the latter’s failure to grasp the unevenness of 
structuralism or to see the struggle of tendencies within such a heterogeneous 
movement of diverse authors, texts, and insights. There is a pressing theoretical 
need to distinguish between those features of structuralism that can lead to 
enriching Marxism and those features that must be kept at a distance. In a word, 
Deleuze’s lecture inadequately sorts out the materialist and idealist elements at 
work within the structuralist ideology. (p. 229) 
What is important is how these comments were reflected in Deleuze’s revision of 
his text. Stolze stresses the inclusion of a ‘a new fourth criterion called that of 
differenciation, with a ‘c’ to distinguish it from the criterion of differentiation with a ‘t’’ (p. 
229). For Deleuze this distinction is a way to rethink different temporalities but also the 
question of virtuality in a dialogue with Althusser. 
Quite clearly, then, Deleuze has embraced Althusser’s critique of the 
‘homogeneous continuity’ and ‘contemporaneity’ at work in the Hegelian account of 
historical time. He agrees that the ‘differential histories’ comprising a given social 
formation manifest their own distinctive rhythms and only exist in a complex state 
of interdependence. However, Deleuze has enriched Althusser’s analysis by 
further demarcating the ‘virtual coexistence’ or ‘differentiation’ of these histories 
from their ‘actualisation’ as particular material effects – that is, their 
‘differenciation’. (p. 232) 
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Moreover, Stolze stresses how in the second of the version of his text Deleuze 
revisits the notion of the ‘empty square’, the paradoxical object that enables 
displacement, on the basis of Balibar’s comments in Reading Capital on the notion of 
value, with Deleuze insisting that value as expression of ‘generalized labour’ ‘is reducible 
neither to the terms of the exchange, nor to the exchange relation itself, but that forms 
an eminently symbolic third term in perpetual displacement, and as a function of which 
the relational variations will be defined.’ (Deleuze 2004, p. 188). Stolze stresses how for 
Deleuze the connection between the subject and the empty space enables the emergence 
of a ‘nomadic subject’, a notion that would later be central in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theoretical investigations.  
Chapter 13 turns to Antonio Negri’s reading of the Book of Job.10 Stolze stresses 
how Negri actually manages to ‘to identify a powerfully materialist dimension of the Book 
of Job’ (p. 241) and to grasp the emancipatory aspect inscribed at the heart of Messianic 
references. Consequently, he suggests that ‘Negri has made a formidable contribution to 
what could be termed a distinctively Marxist wisdom tradition’ (p. 245). 
Chapter 14 turns to Jürgen Habermas and his conception of the public sphere. Stolze 
retraces Habermas intellectual trajectory and how he gradually moved to a position that 
capitalism is unsurpassable: ‘although Habermas has regularly called attention to the 
failures of advanced capitalist societies, he has equally insisted that capitalism itself 
cannot be superseded’ (p. 253). Stolze presents all the difficulties that Habermas faces in 
his attempt both to defend the need for autonomous public spheres and turn towards a 
more ‘realistic’ political position, and how Habermas ends up with a theorization which 
recognizes a rather minimal ability of movements and citizens to actually induce social 
transformation. 
Although Habermas explicitly permits citizens within ‘weak’ public spheres to 
discuss anything they like – presumably even the structural transformation of 
capitalist social relations – nonetheless his allowance for such freewheeling 
discussion has a political price to be paid. These opinions, no matter how urgently 
or persuasively expressed, remain mere opinions; and ultimately citizens must be 
content either symbolically to storm an administrative fortress (the siege model) 
or else generate certain messages from the periphery that at best will eventually 
filter across to be interpreted, and legitimated, by the administrative centre (the 
sluice model). Either way, their ability to carry out genuinely collective action has 
been seriously undercut. (p. 260). 
Chapter 15 takes as starting point Stolze’s ‘dismay at Richard Rorty’s rejection of a 
“bottom-up way of achieving utopia”’ (p. 263). To that he opposes his own version of a 
‘weak universalism’ (p. 265), which is largely indebted to Étiennes Balibar’s exploration of 
the ambiguities of universalism11 and also Balibar’s insistence on the inseparability of 
freedom and equality and on the ‘intersubjective or “transindividual” nature of ideal 
universality’ (p. 268). Stolze insists on the possibility of a ‘specifically normative Principle 
of Self-Emancipation’ which he defines in the following manner: 
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Actions undertaken to improve the wellbeing of the oppressed should be either led 
by the oppressed themselves or, to the extent that this is not feasible, at their 
behest and under their authority. (p. 271) 
 
Stolze insists that if we think emancipation as self-emancipation, then it is also 
necessary to accept the position that ‘rights should never be imposed from above but 
must always be claimed from below, either directly by victims of oppression themselves 
or, if this is not feasible, by those who indirectly seek to support the self-emancipation of 
such victims by acting as if the oppressed themselves were in charge’ (p. 276). Moreover, 
again drawing on Balibar’s writings, he suggests that this also points towards a form of 
‘bottom-up’ or potentially communist civility. Stolze also attempts to answer any potential 
criticisms to his position, either in the form of calls for a ‘strong’ universalism, or in the 
form of positions that deny the existence of any normative aspect in Marx’s mature work, 
to which he opposes his own political conception of normativity: ‘without political struggle 
from below, there can be no moral progress from above’ (p. 292). 
The next chapter is dedicated to Islamophobia with Stolze beginning with Sartre’s 
writings on Anti-Semitism12 and how they were also influential in critiques of racism, 
colonialism and sexism, in order to suggest the possibility of treating Islamophobia in 
similar terms. This how he defines his approach: 
Bearing in mind Stephen Eric Bronner’s caveat that ‘solidarity with one’s own 
group is easy – solidarity with the Other is always more difficult’, my concern is 
not with how Muslims themselves act in a self-emancipatory manner but with how 
Muslims and non-Muslims can engage in a common struggle against 
Islamophobia. This is the question of how, to use Deleuzian terminology, non-
Muslims may enter into a becoming-Muslim – a ‘minoritarian’ emancipatory 
process that can help to dialecticise the ‘majoritarian’ emancipatory process 
associated with class. (p. 301) 
As a result, resistance to anti-Semitism and to Islamophobia lies in reclaiming the 
concrete features of our human condition and in fashioning societies grounded in 
solidarity and justice for all. (p. 302) 
The next chapter attempts to deal with the moral arguments associated with the 
Climate Crisis. The first argument is the Urgency Argument based on the premise that 
‘one should urgently act to halt any grave threat posing serious harm to others’ (p. 304). 
The second argument is the Unsustainability Argument based on the unsustainable 
character of contemporary capitalist development. To the Urgency Argument Stolze adds 
the Obstruction Argument, which points to the ways that capitalism obstructs collective 
action to tackle the current Climate Crisis. From this he moves to the Removal Argument 
which is constructed in the following manner: 
1. The capitalist mode of production is a grave threat posing serious harm 
to human development. 
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2. Any mode of production that is a grave threat posing serious harm to 
human development should be removed. 
3. But capitalism must be removed through collective action. 
4. Therefore, capitalism should be removed through collective action. (p. 317) 
The final chapter, which is defined as a Coda, suggests that a major influence on 
both Spinoza and Marx was Aristotle, ‘in particular with respect to what Aristotle called 
eudaimonia, Spinoza called beatitudo, and Marx called ‘real’ – as opposed to ‘illusory’ – 
happiness’ (p. 322). Stolze insists that eudaimonia refers to a practical activity and thus it 
is consistent with Marx’s vision in Capital of a society based on the production by freely 
associated men, and he goes at length how in Marx’s reference to a potential socialist 
future we can find such a conception of a society that expands free time and the potential 
for collective eudaimonia. Stolze insists that although Spinoza seems to align himself 
more with Epicurus, Democritus and Lucretius, one can still find elements of an 
Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia, especially when he discusses beatitude. Moreover, 
Stolze suggests a certain materialist reversal of the order of Spinoza’s Ethics in order to 
think a version of beatitude that is based on the common potentiality for emancipation 
and happiness of finite human beings in their collective practices. 
But what if we were to read Spinoza’s Ethics not according to its order of 
presentation but instead according to its conceptual order? What if we were to 
carry out a materialist reversal and begin with finite modes, human in particular, 
seek what is common to all as we move ontologically outward, and come to 
appreciate how everything holds together as diversity in unity? Beginning with Part 
three, we would move in succession to Part Four, Part Two, Part One, and still 
wind up at Part Five – but with a new appreciation of what Spinoza means by 
substance and beatitude. Substance would then be seen as a point of arrival and 
not as a point of departure; and we would grow accustomed to calling metaphysics 
not first but last philosophy. 
Beatitude would turn out to be not the solitary experience of a fortunate few but a 
common good to be experienced through sharing with others to the greatest 
degree conceivable, ultimately, with all of humanity and the entire world. In 
continuity with the Aristotelian Left, and in particular with his Islamic philosophical 
predecessor Averroes, Spinoza agrees that the human intellect is not privately and 
exclusively held by individuals but opens up to the entire cosmos. (p. 336) 
Based on such a reading of Spinoza in light of what he defines as a ‘Left 
Aristotelian’ tradition, Stolze suggests that anticapitalist struggle can be conceived, in a 
certain way in an eternal dimension, in the sense that it points beyond the current 
conjuncture towards a society organized on the basis of the common interest of 
humanity. 
If human beings are to transform social structures and institutions effectively and 
lastingly, then they must go beyond conceiving them abstractly and isolated from 
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one another; instead, they must grasp how these structures and institutions fit 
concretely into a larger scheme (whether it is called ‘divine’ or ‘natural’ is moot, for 
these descriptions are functionally equivalent in Spinoza’s metaphysics). Indeed, 
this realisation allows for the demarcation of an eternal dimension to political 
struggle that is not limited to merely episodic skirmishes. In order to overturn 
capitalism one must be able to step back and comprehend it from ‘the perspective 
of eternity’ and thereby orient anti-capitalist strategy that could lead to a new 
mode of production under – as Marx put it in Capital – the ‘conscious and planned 
control’ of ‘freely associated’ men and women.  Let us call the anticipatory 
experience of this eternal dimension of political struggle by its Spinozist name, 
beatitude, for it points beyond the present conjuncture to how one day society 
could be reorganised in the common interest of all humanity (p. 347) 
 
The fact that the book ends with such an attempt towards a Marxist-Spinozist 
conception of beatitude in a certain way encapsulates the originality of Stolze’s approach. 
In a certain way on might say that Stolze attempts to research the conditions for a 
materialist Ethics, in the sense of a materialist ontology that can form the basis of a 
collective achievement of both the social forms of emancipated human labour, but also 
the collective wisdom and intellectual love that indeed lead to beatitude and eudaimonia, 
conceived as both social and intellectual states. This is the point where the common 
threads running through the book and the different chapters meet. On the one hand, 
Stolze retraces a line of thinking, from Althusser, to Deleuze, to Macherey that inspired 
by Spinoza (but in the case of Stolze also by a certain ‘Left Aristotelianism’) redefines 
materialism as a radical anti-teleological position, beyond any historical metaphysics. On 
the other hand, Stolze takes this as the starting point in order to rethink an Ethics, not in 
the sense of a set of moral assumptions, but in that of a collective emancipatory praxis 
that leads to a society where collective understanding and knowledge, what Stolze even 
suggests to describe as ‘Marxist wisdom’, enables the collective experimentation with 
new social forms beyond the constraints of the market and beyond the risk of an 
imminent ecological disaster of planetary dimension. This is combined with an acute 
perception of how in the Biblical tradition and historical Christianity we can find the 
dynamic of a movement towards emancipation from poverty, imperial power and fear. 
And it is here that we can find the originality of Stolze and the importance of his 
contribution to a rethinking materialism as an emancipatory philosophical practice 
aligned to political projects aiming at facilitating the self-emancipation of that vast 
majority of persons that in contemporary societies have to endure the humiliating and 
alienating effects of capitalist exploitation. Thus he manages to bring forward an ethical 
and praxeological element that is usually absent from most discussions of the tradition 
associated with Althusserian theoretical anti-humanism, which I think has a broader 
significance and enables both a better understanding of this tradition and better dialogue 
between it and other philosophical traditions. And his that by a series of texts, in fact a 
philosophical trajectory, that, at the same time, offer important readings of theoretical 
confrontations with these questions, thus making evident that the process of elaborating 
such a potential materialist Ethics can only be dialogic and agonistic, combining textual 
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attentiveness, dialectical reasoning and a militant optic, in sum a certain idea of reading 
and writing as interventions.  
Consequently, Stolze makes an important contribution to the open question of a 
philosophy for Marxism, in the sense of a philosophy that both enables the critical 
theoretical work that is necessary to understand and fight exploitation and oppression 
but also allies itself with the collective praxis that can induce such social transformation.  
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